Teaching Free Will: The Libet Experiment, Neuroscience and Sartre

Philosophy / Free Will and Neuroscience · Grades 11–12

Teaching Free Will: The Libet Experiment, Neuroscience and Sartre

Quick answerTo teach free will and the Libet experiment, first separate the questions: freedom of action, freedom of will, determinism and predictability. Then show what Libet-style studies measure and what they do not. Sartre and Neuroscience does this in four lessons: prediction versus coercion, a Libet timeline, the 2012 accumulator model, and a systematic comparison with Sartre's account of responsibility.

Students meet the Libet experiment through headlines saying neuroscience has disproved free will. Most cannot say what was measured, what was inferred, or which kind of freedom is supposedly at stake. Sartre and Neuroscience gives you a 32-page student book and a 20-page teacher guide for four 90-minute lessons. Students reconstruct a teaching timeline with model values, sketch fictional signal trajectories to see why an average is smoother than any single trial, and test whether "every decision has neural conditions" really leads to "responsibility is meaningless." The guide includes expected answers and marking for two practice assessments.

See the unit →
32 + 20 pagesstudent book and teacher guide
4 × 90 mincore double lessons
2 practiceassessments with 100-point marking

Resources that fit

Units and bundles for this topic

Sartre and Neuroscience is the unit for free will and the Libet debate. The Existentialism Bundle adds Sartre on existence, anguish and bad faith, and de Beauvoir and Camus for less than four single units, and Upper Secondary Complete covers all 24 units for whole-course planning.

The teaching problem

Where free will lessons usually go wrong

The first problem is vocabulary. Students use "free," "determined" and "predictable" as if they meant the same thing. The unit starts with a simple contrast: a friend accurately predicts your food order, and someone else forces you to order through threats. In both cases the order is known in advance, but only one of them interferes with your freedom. That case lets you separate freedom of action, acting on your own reasons without coercion, from a stronger freedom of will that may require being able to choose otherwise. It also shows that determinism and predictability differ. A deterministic system can be hard to predict, and good prediction alone does not disprove freedom.

The second problem is the Libet experiment itself. In classic Libet tasks, people make simple spontaneous movements and then report when they became aware of the intention to move. The averaged readiness potential begins before that reported time. The unit's teaching timeline uses model values, signal onset at −550 ms, reported intention at −200 ms and movement at 0 ms, and asks one question: what extra premise turns that order into "the decision was already made"? The answer needs two assumptions, that signal onset marks a completed decision and that reports of awareness are reliable. Both can be challenged, and a finger movement is not a career decision.

The third problem is jumping from neuroscience straight to a verdict on responsibility. The unit uses the 2012 accumulator model by Schurger, Sitt and Dehaene, in which spontaneous neural fluctuations drift until they cross a threshold. When many such trajectories are aligned at movement onset and averaged, they produce a rising signal that no single trial has to show. That changes how the readiness potential can be read, but it does not prove freedom either. Only then do students compare Sartre, for whom freedom means taking a stance toward possibilities and answering for one's projects, with what neuroscience actually measures, avoiding both hostility to science and premature reductionism.

A sequence that works

A teachable sequence on free will and the brain

These five steps follow the unit's four sections and its practice assessments.

  1. Which freedom?Open with the predicted food order and the coerced one. Students separate knowledge, causation and coercion, then write one compatibilist and one incompatibilist question about the same case. This step makes sure everyone knows which concept of freedom a study would have to address.
  2. The Libet paradigmStudents draw the teaching timeline and mark three layers: what was measured, what was reported and what was interpreted. They name the extra premises behind "the decision was already made" and judge how far a spontaneous finger movement can be generalized to a deliberate life choice.
  3. The accumulator modelStudents sketch three fictional signal trajectories that fluctuate differently and end at a threshold, align them at the endpoint, and see that the average looks smoother than any of them. The guide is clear: the model changes how the signal is read but does not settle the metaphysical question.
  4. Comparing with SartreThree positions: every decision has neural conditions; therefore reasons are ineffective and responsibility is meaningless; responsibility requires evaluating reasons even when this is physically realized. Students test whether the second follows from the first, and why the third fits compatibilism but should not simply be attributed to Sartre.
  5. Testing a headlineThe practice assessments give students a headline claiming a brain scan ends the debate about responsibility, based on a study of spontaneous button presses that omits accuracy, sample and alternative models, and a fictional study predicting simple choices with 65 percent accuracy. Students reconstruct the missing premises in writing.

Where it goes wrong

Misconceptions to plan for

These four claims come straight from popular coverage of free will research, and the unit addresses each one.

"If my choice can be predicted, it was not free." Good prediction alone does not disprove freedom. Prediction concerns knowledge of someone's preferences, while a threat changes the actions available to them. The food order case makes this concrete: the friend who predicts your order has not limited your choice, but the person who threatens you has.

"The readiness potential shows the decision is made before we are aware of it." That inference assumes that signal onset marks a completed decision and that participants' reports of awareness are reliable. Both need examining. The accumulator model offers another reading of the averaged signal, and findings from a simple lab task do not automatically extend to deliberate choices.

"Unpredictable behavior is free behavior." Chance or ignorance does not establish self-determination. A random act is not more free because nobody saw it coming. Any account of freedom has to say what kind of control it requires, which is why the unit starts by sorting out concepts before looking at any study.

"Every decision has neural conditions, so reasons are ineffective and responsibility is meaningless." This conclusion needs further premises about how reasons and brain processes relate. Saying conscious reasons never matter goes well beyond observing that the brain is involved. Strong answers do not deny neural conditions; they examine how far the conclusion reaches.

Cross-curricular

Linking philosophy with psychology and biology

This topic sits naturally between philosophy and the sciences. The unit's concept page defines determinism, compatibilism, the readiness potential and operationalization, the last of which students in psychology courses will recognize from research methods. The Libet and accumulator lessons ask the same questions a psychology class would: what exactly was measured, how was awareness reported, and what does averaging across trials do to the data. A science colleague could co-teach the second or third lesson without changing the materials. The jigsaw page, with home and expert groups, can be used to split the four sections across a mixed class and then bring the findings together.

Every timeline and trajectory in the unit is labeled as a teaching model, not original data, so students practice reading research claims without being misled about real results. The teacher guide lists the Schurger et al. papers from 2012 and 2021 and Sartre's Existentialism Is a Humanism for further reading. The unit title names a comparison of positions, not a historical debate between Sartre and later researchers, which is worth saying explicitly in class. It also prevents the common mix-up in which students treat a 2012 model as a reply written to Sartre.

Wider strand

Free will within a unit on existentialism

If you teach existentialism, this unit works best after students already know Sartre's basic claims. Sartre and the Priority of Existence covers existence before essence, using a pair of scissors and a student whose family has already picked her profession. Anguish, Abandonment and Despair covers bad faith through cases like Jonas, who picks an adviser he knows will back his plan and then says he had no choice. Those ideas make the comparison in the fourth Libet lesson much sharper. Bad faith in particular gives students a test for the headline claim that neuroscience removes responsibility: is it a description of the brain, or an excuse?

Sartre, de Beauvoir and Camus then widens the question from individual freedom to concrete freedom and the absurd. One case contrasts two people facing their first job decision, one with three training offers and one with only one because of money. Together the four units let students see that "Are we free?" is several questions at once: about the brain, about responsibility, and about the social conditions in which choices are made. Each unit stands alone, with its own concept page and practice assessments, so you can also teach the Libet unit on its own.

Questions teachers ask

Frequently asked questions

Which courses does the unit fit?

It is written for grades 11–12 philosophy and fits electives on philosophy of mind, ethics or existentialism. It roughly fits IB Diploma Philosophy and Theory of Knowledge discussions, A Level Philosophy (Years 12–13) and Australian senior secondary Philosophy (Years 11–12), and can support AP Psychology classes discussing consciousness. TeachLessons is not affiliated with or endorsed by the College Board, IB, any exam board, ACARA or any state. The unit was originally developed for German upper-secondary courses; the English edition is a full parallel version.

Do students need a science background?

No. The unit explains the readiness potential, averaging and the accumulator model in plain language, and all timelines and trajectories are simplified teaching models with clearly marked values. Students sketch and compare them by hand. What matters is the reasoning: separating measurement, report and interpretation. Students with a psychology or biology background will find the methods questions familiar, which can help in mixed classes.

Is the Libet data in the unit real?

No, and the materials say so. The timeline values (−550 ms, −200 ms, 0 ms) and the three signal trajectories are teaching models built to reconstruct an argument, not original measurements. The 65 percent prediction study in the practice material is also fictional. This lets students practice analyzing research claims without misquoting real findings. The teacher guide gives the published sources for further study.

How long does the unit take?

The core is four 90-minute double lessons with minute-by-minute plans in the teacher guide. Workshop and extension pages may need extra time. The guide suggests 45 to 60 minutes for the jigsaw and 90 to 135 minutes for each of the two practice assessments. Four double lessons do not cover every activity, so you can choose what fits your group.

What is included?

A 32-page student book (A4 PDF) with four five-page sections, a concept page, two practice assessments with writing plans, a jigsaw and a self-check. A 20-page teacher guide with sequence planning, differentiation, lesson plans, expected reasoning for every task and marking guidance on a 100-point scheme. An editable Word text edition is included. Delivery is an instant download, and the PDFs print on US Letter with fit-to-page.

Does the unit argue that free will exists?

No. It does not push a verdict either way. The marking guidance says different positions are acceptable as long as students state explicit criteria, use evidence and engage with a serious opposing view. Strong answers do not deny that the brain is involved in decisions; they test how far a particular conclusion reaches. Students who defend determinism and students who defend freedom can both score well.

Teach the free will debate with the evidence in view

Sartre and Neuroscience gives you the timeline, the models and the marking for four lessons.

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